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At this point in history the world is facing the threat of annihilation.
But also, for the first time in history, technological progress has created
the hope that hunger might be conquered.  Both these facts  are  a  chal-
lenge to mankind.
The rate of Russia's economic  growth and her present capacity  are
known only in crude estimates. But the fact that growth has been rapid
is world knowledge.  She has already begun  to use her economic power
as  a tool in the cold war. If her ruthless use of this power is  also clever
enough,  Russia  may  make  important  strategic  gains  which  do  not
involve military risks.
In  South America,  Africa,  Southeast  Asia,  and  the  Middle  East,
population  is  rising  rapidly  and  threatening  to  engulf  the  economic
growth that is taking place.  Hunger and undernourishment  persist in  a
world where men are no longer passive  about it.
This is the world setting for America's  foreign economic policy. We
dare not make serious mistakes. At home we have achieved abundance.
We  are  an "affluent  society."  This  is especially  true  of the  agricultural
sector  of our economy.  Our agriculture  is  the envy  of Russia  and her
satellites.  But  technological  progress  from  the  application  of  our re-
search  and  education  has  been  flowing  a  little  too  fast  for  even  our
rapidly  growing economy to absorb.
Stocks of price supported agricultural commodities have been grow-
ing  in spite  of  extensive  surplus  disposal  operations.  Prices  of  com-
modities not supported  by federal price programs  are unsatisfactory  to
many growers.
In this kind of domestic and world environment an often suggested
possibility  is simply  exporting the surplus  to  a world that needs  more
food.
These  are  the broad  issues that confront  the American  public  and
policy makers.  They  also constitute the backdrop for the team  analysis
and  report.  One of the  important  tasks facing  our nation and  specif-
ically  assigned  to the  Foreign  Agricultural  Service  is  to  develop  our
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51foreign  agricultural trade  policy in  such  a  way that  it will expand  the
demand  for the  products  of American  agriculture  and  relieve some  of
the  pressures  of  excess output.  But  this objective must be pursued in a
way that is consistent with our over-all foreign policy aimed at national
security and the defense of freedom in the world.
The task of this team was to study  this policy in process  in Europe.
THE  EUROPEAN  MARKET  AS  AN  OUTLET  FOR  SURPLUSES
With  enough  creative  imagination,  some  of  the  surpluses  from
abundant  agricultural production  in the  United States can be used for
economic  development  in the  underdeveloped  part  of the  world.  This
is  not  a  feasible  program  for  Europe,  and  Europeans  are  concerned
about  our surplus disposal operations  in the  rest of the world.
The  existing  opportunities  in  Europe  are  for  tough  competitive
trade,  not surplus disposal.
In countries the team  visited the postwar recovery  is virtually com-
plete.  It began  with some  relief  feeding  under UNRRA  and the  army
in  occupied  countries.  It  changed  to  recovery  with  Marshall  aid  and
tapered  off with  some  assistance  under  Public  Law  480. It was,  from
the  point  of view  of  our  objectives,  fantastically  successful.  Commu-
nism has been stopped and turned back in Europe. Industry is booming.
A base for further dynamic economic  growth has been established. The
300  million  people  of  Western  Europe have  regained  a high  level  of
nutrition. About  85 percent of the food consumed is produced  in West-
ern Europe,  and the  rest is  imported.
Opportunities  of the United  States for developing  markets in West-
ern Europe  will depend  on what happens  to Western  Europe's  import
demand  for agricultural  products,  and it will  also depend  on the com-
petitive  position of the United States in this market.
The United States has  a substantial  share of this market but a care-
ful look at the  forces  of supply  and demand does not encourage opti-
mistic forecasts for substantial future increases  in this market. Europe is
our principal  unsubsidized commercial  market and  now takes  50 per-
cent of our 4 billion dollars of agricultural exports.
OUTPUT,  TOTAL  EXPORTS,  AND  EXPORTS  TO  EUROPE
OF  SELECTED  COMMODITIES,  1959
U.  S. Exports  to
Commodity  U. S. Output  Total Exports  Europe  and U.  K.
Cotton  11  mil.  bales  5.7  mil. bales  3.2  mil. bales
Wheat  951  mil. bu.  402 mil. bu.  77 mil.  bu.
Feed grains  143 mil. tons  10.5 mil.  tons  5.3 mil.  tons
Meat  27,000 mil. lbs.  199 mil.  lbs.  51  mil. lbs.
52On the  demand  side,  population  is  growing  more slowly  than  in
most of the rest  of the world.  The  population  increase  is only  from  .6
to .8 percent per year. Incomes have been rising rapidly with per capita
rates varying  by countries  in the 1950-56  period from  2  to 7  percent.
Dr. Arthur I. Hanau of Goettingen University of Goettingen,  Germany
expects this rate to settle at an average of about 2.5 to 3 percent as  the
first  bloom  of  recovery  from  World  War  II  ends.  He  estimates  the
income  elasticity  for food  to be  about  .35.  This  means  that  a yearly
increase  in income  of 3 percent  would increase  demand for food  1.05
percent  per year at the producer  level  in Western Europe.  Combining
a .7  percent increase  in demand  generated  by population  growth with
1.05  percent  from  income  growth,  the  annual  increase  in  demand
would  be  1.75  percent.
On the supply side, farm output has been growing also. The sources
of  increased  agricultural production  in Europe  are  familiar  to  Amer-
icans.  They include:  (1)  increase of yields per  acre and  improvement
in the feed conversion rate and  (2)  replacement  of animal draft power
by tractors  (since this replacement  is far from complete it will continue
to depress demand for livestock feed for some time).
Dr.  Hanau  estimates that output will  increase  about  2  to 2.5  per-
cent per  year.  He  does not envisage  any major break-throughs.  Com-
bining  these  two  figures,  the  team  is  not very  optimistic  about  U.  S.
market expansion in Western  Europe.
These  are  over-all  estimates  of  demand  and  supply  for  Western
Europe.  They do not shed much light on the share of this export mar-
ket that  the  United States  may have.  Market  development  operations
are important.  With but limited observations,  the team finds it difficult
to  appraise  how  effective  our  market  development  efforts  can  be  in
increasing the  United States share  in this market.
Examples  of  the  educational  and  promotional  efforts  which  the
team observed were:
1.  Cotton promotion  work is underway  all over  Europe with ac-
tive cooperation from the cotton textile industry and retail  dis-
tributors  of  cotton  goods  under  the  leadership  of  the  Cotton
Council.
2.  The use of grain sorghums for feed is being promoted especially
in Italy,  by the Grain Sorghum Producers'  Association.
3.  The  work  of  the  Soybean  Council  of America  seemed  to  be
imaginative  and effective  in finding outlets for all kinds of soy-
bean products.
4.  Considerable  attention  is  being  directed  to poultry promotion
work  all over  Europe.  With  a growing  demand  for  meat  the
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poultry products and conducting  education on the use of Amer-
ican  type  packaged  frozen  poultry.  As  the  retail  distribution
system  changes  to  include  supermarkets  and  households  ac-
quire refrigeration  these efforts  may prove rewarding.
5.  The  Farm  Bureau  has  a trade promotion  office  in Rotterdam,
which  attempts  to serve  as  an information  and  contact  center
for prospective  buyers  and  sellers of any  and all U. S. agricul-
tural products.
6.  Such  trade  factors  as  quality,  price,  dependable  supply,  good
merchandise,  service,  and  packaging  are  increasingly  impor-
tant in European markets. The United States has stepped up its
efforts  in  this  regard.  For  example,  the  Great  Plains  Wheat
Growers  office  in Rotterdam  is  actively working  to determine
the basic characteristics  of wheat needed for the European mar-
ket  and assisting buyers in obtaining  these kinds  of wheat from
the  United  States.
Some  new developments  will have  important  influences  on  supply
of and demand for agricultural products  in the Western  European  and
United  Kingdom markets  and will affect the import demand for Amer-
ican  farm products.  Most of these developments  give rise  to uncertain-
ties  that should  be watched  rather than measurable  variables  for pur-
poses  of prediction.
First  among these variables  with  a good deal of uncertainty  is the
Common  Market  which  includes  West  Germany,  France,  Italy,  Hol-
land,  Belgium,  and Luxemburg.  At this  stage  in its  development  it is
surrounded  by  a  good deal  of speculation  and  its  effect  is  uncertain.
This  is  especially  true  for  agriculture  since  the  Rome  treaty,  which
created it, provided a good many qualifications for agriculture only.
One  of the  important  considerations  is  just how much  preference
member countries will finally receive and how high the barriers for non-
member  countries will be. The United Kingdom in particular  is  deeply
concerned  about this  as an outsider doing much trading with Common
Market  countries.  This  concern  stimulated  her leadership  resulting  in
the Outer Seven arrangement.  Greece  is  also deeply concerned.
Holland,  as a member country,  is likewise concerned. As one exam-
ple,  the  very existence  of her  livestock  farmers  and livestock  industry
depends  on low priced  feeds  for low  cost production  to  remain  com-
petitive.  Only 45 percent of her exports  are  to Common Market coun-
tries,  and  55  percent  are  to other  countries.  Although Dutch  officials
are convinced that some compromise  toward higher tariffs  on feed will
be  required  as  common  rates  are  developed  for  the  six-country  area,
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and also to work  toward  progressive  rate reductions  later.  This  influ-
ence  could spell  the  difference  between  a  course  of freer  trade,  as  a
Common Market policy,  as opposed to pressures  by some participants
to raise a protectionist  wall.
For agricultural  trade reasons,  as  well  as  for  broader policy  goals,
the United  States  shares  this concern  regarding whether the  Common
Market  will accentuate  trade within Common Market  countries  at the
expense  of multilateral  trade based  on comparative  advantage.
In addition to uncertainty about the impact of trade restrictions  on
our exports to the European market the United States has another con-
cern. The prospects for expanded trade provided by the Common Mar-
ket are very encouraging  to both French and Italian  agriculture.  Both
nations  have  a  resource  base for  considerable  agricultural  expansion
from the  application  of capital and modern technology.  The Common
Market may well spur this development.
Another variable which injects some additional uncertainty  into the
appraisal  of  market development  opportunities  in Western  Europe  is
the  direction  which  price  and  income  policy  may take.  A  number  of
forces seem to be developing within Europe to encourage adjustment of
agriculture  toward  a more efficient lower cost production.  As a result,
production  incentives  have  been  reduced  some  and  additional  moves
of  this  kind may  follow.  As  these  changes  in agricultural  policy  take
place  they  may  favor  increase  in  trade  with  the  United  States.  On
balance  it  seems  more  likely,  however,  that policy  will  tend  to  con-
tinue  to  protect  this  market  during  the  shift  to  lower  cost  output.
Expansion in demand will largely be met by increased output that will
likely  accompany  adjustment  to lower cost  output.
Perhaps a few commodity generalizations  are justified in looking  at
market development prospects in Western Europe.
Free Europe and the United Kingdom  are essentially dependent  on
imports for cotton  supplies.  During the past  two seasons  Free Europe
imported an average of about  350,000,000  bales and  produced about
514,000  bales.  Only  slight  increases  in  production  are  in  prospect;
therefore,  Free  Europe  will  continue  to depend  on  imported  cotton.
Greece  is the largest producer  (averaging about 290,000 bales the last
two years)  and Spain is next. Neither  is in the Common Market.
Efforts  in the  Common Market  area  to expand  agricultural  output
will not include cotton. Furthermore,  tariff concessions  are likely to be
more  liberal for cotton than for many other farm products.  Under  the
55Common  Market agreement,  cotton  along with  other raw materials  is
to be admitted at a  tariff rate not exceeding  3 percent.
European  demand  prospects  for cotton  depend  almost entirely  on
the  extent to which synthetics continue to replace cotton and the extent
of total economic development in Free Europe.  Tendencies toward self-
sufficiency,  as well as relative  prices of fibers, can be important in stim-
ulating  the  use  of European  made  synthetics.  If economic  integration
results in general economic development in the six countries, per capita
consumption  of textiles  could  be  expected  to increase.  This poses  the
question of whether such increased demand would be met by synthetics,
cotton from other exporting countries, or cotton from the United States.
Perhaps  Common  Market  countries  will  increase  takings  of U.  S. cot-
ton enough at least to offset effects of the declining cotton textile indus-
try  in  England.  Thus,  prospects  for  stabilizing  United  States  cotton
exports  to Europe seem better than prospects for materially increasing
them.
Theory would  indicate  that demand  expansion prospects  for U. S.
exports might likely be best for those commodities with higher income
elasticities.  Dr. Hanau has made  estimates  of income elasticities  which
he says are "guesses based on experience  and some statistical evidence"
as  follows:
Total  food  .35
Potatoes  -0.2
Cereals  0.0
Vegetable  oils  0.2
Meat  0.6-0.65
Fresh fruits  0.5-1.0
Fruit juice  1.0+
This theoretically,  at least,  suggests good prospects  for either feed
grains or meats and for fruits.3
From  the  team's  observations,  such  demand  prospects  as  are  in-
dicated by relatively high income elasticities for meat seem much more
likely to be translated into export demand for feed grain than for meat.
Our meat exports are small. United Kingdom and European farms have
almost no alternative for livestock production as a means for providing
balanced farm organization  and use of labor. Livestock production also
makes  possible  intensification  where labor is  plentiful  and mechaniza-
tion reduces  the demand for crop labor. Our meat prices have not been
competitive  either  with  domestic  European  prices  or  other  sources.
'With  an  income  growth  rate  of 3 percent  per  year  and  population  growth  of .7
percent,  these  figures  indicate  an  estimated  growth  in  demand  for  all  food  of  1.75  per
year.  With  .6 income  elasticity for meat  and  1.0 for  fruit juice,  the comparable  estimated
demand  increase  for meat  would  be  2.5  percent  and  for fruit juice  3.7  percent.
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broilers, but equal enthusiasm from the European poultry industry for
expanding  broiler production  in Europe.
The  United  States,  with  plentiful  supplies  and  lower  prices  for
feed grain, has increased exports and appears to be in a strong compet-
itive position.  Nevertheless,  our export market is  essentially  a residual
market. The other feed grain competitors are forced  to sell at whatever
price  our market or export policy  sets  since  they have  neither  a good
alternative  market  nor  adequate  storage  facilities  and  financing.  For
this reason,  if our market prices  remain  as  low as  they  are now,  they
will  not tend  to encourage  expansion  in the  rest of the world,  and we
will be  less subject to  criticism  for dumping.
But  a number  of sobering  facts  need  to be  considered  before  we
become  optimistic  about  expanded  markets  for feed  grains.
Most  of  the  opportunities  for increased  agricultural  output  with
improved  technology  in  the  United  Kingdom  and  Northern  Europe
are  in  livestock feed-either  forage  or feed  grain.  Most opportunities
for  lower  cost or more  mechanized  crop  production  are  also  in  this
direction.  As  one  example,  even  with  the  low  income  elasticity  for
cereals,  exports  of  high quality wheat might be  expanded  a little, but
if  this  demand  develops  and  as  soft  wheat  is  replaced  as  bread  grain,
the next most economical use for this European wheat is livestock feed.
Fruits,  especially  processed  fruits,  offer  grounds  for  limited  opti-
mism.  Even here,  this  optimism must be  tempered.  Because  economic
development  is  an  important  national  goal for  all the  nations  around
the  Mediterranean,  our over-all  policy also  is  committed  to help pro-
mote development.  Economic development programs for Italy, Greece,
Israel,  Spain,  and  other Mediterranean  areas must recognize  the high
comparative  advantages  these  areas  have  for fruit  growing.  A  strong
program  for market development  for U. S. fruits would compete  with
our economic  development  goals.
Market development  opportunities may be summarized  as follows:
1.  Surplus  disposal  opportunities  in  Western  Europe  have  vir-
tually  disappeared.
2.  Opportunities  to improve the competitive position of the United
States may be found by being  sensitive to the unique  specifica-
tions  to meet market  requirements.
3.  The  opportunity  for  large  market  expansion  is  limited  by  a
relatively  slow rate  of growth of demand which  is  likely  to be
matched by  expanded output on European  farms.
574.  We  should  probably consider  as successful,  a market develop-
ment  program  which  manages  to  maintain  our  present  level
of  export  demand.
THE  COMMON  MARKET
As indicated earlier the development of the Common Market poses
many unknowns.  In no area do we find more uncertainties  than in the
development  of  agricultural  trade policy.
In spite  of  General  De Gaulle's  insistence  that he  looks  upon  the
Common  Market  only  as  an  institution  for  economic  integration  in
Europe,  it probably  would  not have developed had it not been  for the
hope  that economic  integration  would  also  be  a step toward  political
integration  in  Western  Europe.  This  is  the  reason  why  Chancellor
Adenauer  supported  it,  and  it  is  one  of  the  reasons  it  received  the
blessing  of  the  United  States.
The  very hopes  that  have  inspired our support  are  also  the  fears
that have  inspired strong  attacks from the Communists.  These attacks
strengthen  our  conviction  that  somehow  the  developments  from  the
Common  Market will  strengthen  the  economies  and  raise the  level  of
living  of the  countries  of  Western  Europe,  that it will ultimately  lead
to a greater flow of trade benefiting all and contribute  indirectly to our
national  security.
But  these  hopes  may  not  materialize.  The  forces  most  likely  to
lead  the Common  Market away from the  "Promised  Land"  and make
it a new institution for internal restricted trade are in agriculture.  United
States policy  will have  an  important  bearing  on the direction  develop-
ments  will  take.
THE  COLD  WAR  AND  THE  THREAT  OF  ECONOMIC  WARFARE
By the nature of her political  system  and because  she is committed
to world  revolution,  Russia is  in a position  to create  political and  eco-
nomic  furor  almost  at  will.  As  a  consequence  she  tends  to hold  the
initiative in  the  cold war  chess  game.
In  any  case  we  apparently  face  a  situation  where  international
trade  and  economic  development  aid  will  be  used  as  tools  for  eco-
nomic  war.  We  are  uncertain  how much  economic  power Russia  and
her  allies  have  and  we  cannot  predict  how  they  will  use  it.  But  one
thing  is  fairly  clear.  If they  can  actually  achieve  a  substantial  break-
through  in  agricultural  production,  they can materially  improve  their
levels  of  living  and  they  may  have  a  surplus  to  use  ruthlessly  as  an
economic  weapon  to create  difficulties  in  the free world.
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Their  eating  well  might  even  gradually  reduce  their  enthusiasm  for
world revolution.  For this reason it is not necessarily inconsistent with
our  interests  to  help  them  with  technical  agricultural  exchanges,  or
even  to  participate  in limited  bilateral  negotiations  to  trade  some  of
our surpluses for something  we might want.  More relevant,  our friends
and  allies  may  benefit  from  such  bilateral  trading.  Greek  fruit  for
Russian  oil would be  an example.
The  policy  issue we  must face  is  that Russia  is  likely  at  any  time
to  use economic  policy and  even agricultural  policy as  a political  tool
quite  unrelated  to  typical  economic  motivation.  Our  foreign  agricul-
tural  policy  must  recognize  this  fact.  Our  friends  on  the  rim  of  the
Iron  Curtain  are  perhaps  more  aware  than  we  are  of  these  dangers
and  they are,  through  their trade,  in  a position to alert us  to  dangers
and  to help  us  develop policy  to meet  these  dangers.
OPTIONS  FOR  FOREIGN  AGRICULTURAL  POLICY
As a summary of our considerations  for foreign agricultural policy
we  have  discussed  the  following:
1.  We  may allocate  our resources  and  energy  to market develop-
ment. If  we are  to maintain  our  competitive  position  in the  European
and  United  Kingdom  markets,  a  sound  program  of market  develop-
ment  will  be  important.  In pursuing  this  policy  we  should  recognize
that  trade  is  a "two  way street"-in  order to export agricultural  prod-
ucts  we must  be prepared  to import products  (industrial  and  agricul-
tural).  In  the  short  run  market  development  efforts  will  do  well  to
maintain  our  present level  of exports.  It will  not  be a substitute for  a
sound  foreign  trade policy  and a general  foreign policy,  nor will it be
a  substitute for  a  domestic  agricultural  policy.  It will  not  relieve  the
American  people  of  the  responsibility  to  cope  with  the  problems  of
agricultural  abundance.
2.  The trend of United States  trade policy since World War II has
been  to  remove  restrictions  on  trade  and  encourage  private  foreign
investment.  We have  strongly  supported  GATT.  Partly as  a result  of
this  policy,  the  dollar  position  of  European  nations  has  improved
sharply.  Maintaining  the  volume  of  agricultural  exports  to Europe  in
the  next decade  or two will depend  in part on whether  we continue  to
liberalize  our  general  trade  policy.
3.  We can  also  recognize  that adjustment  to technical  progress  in
agriculture  is  a  world-wide  phenomenon.  Different  nations  at  various
stages  of  economic  development  have  different  problems  but  these
problems  also  have  much  basic  similarity.  The  United  States  might
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experience  in  dealing  with  adjustment  problems.  The  agricultural
attache's  office  is  the  obvious  avenue  through which  such  interchange
could  flow.
4.  The United  States  has greater  stakes in the development  of the
Common Market  than our economic  concerns,  important  as  they are.
We  can  apply  ourselves  to  the  difficult  problems  which  agricultural
trade poses.  We can  take  the leadership  in  moving  toward  relaxation
of trade restrictions  and use  our influence  as  a rich, powerful  trading
nation  to  encourage  progress  in  the  Common  Market  toward  trade
based  on  comparative  advantage.
5.  Our  foreign  agricultural  policy  can  recognize  the  overriding
importance  of  the  cold  war  in  our  foreign  policy.  Not  only  can  our
foreign agricultural  reporting  recognize  the importance  of being  alert
to dangers  of economic  warfare,  but we  can  also  take  the  leadership
in preparing  to  deal with  this sort of warfare  if it develops.
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